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Ethnic Stratification and the Equilibrium of Inequality: 




Why are ethnic movements more likely to turn violent in some multiethnic countries than in oth-
ers? Focusing on the long-term legacies of European overseas colonialism, this article investi-
gates the effect of distinct ethnic cleavage types on the consequences of ethnic group mobiliza-
tion. It argues that the colonial settler states and other stratified multiethnic states are charac-
terized by an equilibrium of inequality, in which historically marginalized groups lack both the 
organizational strength and the opportunities for armed rebellion. In contrast, ethnic mobiliza-
tion in the decolonized states and other segmented multiethnic societies is more likely to trigger 
violent conflict. The paper tests these arguments in a global quantitative study from 1946 to 
2009, using new data on the linguistic and religious segmentation of ethnic groups. The results 
confirm that the extremely unequal colonial settler states experience less violence than the de-
colonized states and other multiethnic countries. Beyond the comparison of post-colonial states, 
ethnic conflict is generally more likely the more segmented and less hierarchically structured 
multiethnic states are. Specifically, stable between-group hierarchies reduce the risk of govern-




On January 25, 2009, the Bolivian people approved a new constitution that significantly 
enhances the rights of the country’s indigenous people. After the election of Evo Morales as the 
country’s first indigenous president in 2005, the enactment of the controversial new constitution 
marked another high point of ethno-political mobilization in Bolivia. Yet, despite considerable 
polarization in the run-up to the referendum, the ballot took place in a “peaceful climate amidst 
high participation.”1 
According to much of the academic literature, the Bolivian scenario of unrestrained ethnic 
politics in a poor and ethnically divided country should constitute a recipe for chaos and civil 
violence.2 Indeed, ethnicity has been a defining feature of the majority of civil conflicts since 
World War II.3 Especially when they take the form of secessionist or irredentist movements, the 
negative externalities of these conflicts go beyond individual states, unsettling the stability of the 
international system.4 Admonitory examples of the relationship between ethnic mobilization and 
civil violence abound: from the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia to the 26-year-long Tamil in-
surgency in Sri Lanka. This begs the question: why did some states, such as Bolivia, that have 
seen large-scale ethnic mobilization in the last decades, escape the perilous consequences of eth-
nic competition? Why did the Civil Rights Movement in the United States of America (USA) not 
degenerate into a violent struggle, as, for example, the Basque nationalist movement, despite the 
                                                 
1 According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, cited in EFE, 27 January 2009, and reproduced by 
soitu.es (available at http://www.soitu.es/soitu/2009/01/27/info/1233091485_007369.html. Accessed 4 
May 2016). 
2 Collier 2009; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006. 
3 Denny and Walter 2014; Gurr et al. 1993. 
4 Saideman 1997; Shelef 2015. 
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call by radical organizations for “an all-black nation state?”5 Or, expressed in more general 
terms: why is ethnic mobilization more dangerous in some multiethnic countries than in others? 
Focusing on the long-term legacies of European overseas colonialism, this article argues 
that violent inter-group conflict is least likely under conditions of profound, historically deter-
mined stratification. In contrast, ethnic mobilization is more likely to trigger violent conflict the 
more segmented ethnic groups are. In the way I use the term here, ethnic stratification is related 
to what has been termed “ranked ethnic systems” in the literature.6 It implies two characteristics 
of ethnic groups’ relation to each other. First, they are positioned in a stable power hierarchy 
with one ethnic group historically dominating state power to the continuing exclusion of other 
groups. Second, ethnic groups have become embedded within the same socio-economic and cul-
tural institutions. This latter condition is what I call ethnic groups’ social integration. It is the 
opposite of social segmentation, i.e. when groups live within the same polity as separate sub-
societies, featuring distinct, relatively independent social systems. Hence, countries in which 
ethnic groups are both hierarchically organized and socially integrated are considered stratified 
systems. 
I argue that ethnic stratification produces what I call an “equilibrium of inequality,” in 
which peaceful contention emerges as the most viable strategy for historically marginalized 
groups. This equilibrium of inequality is produced by four main causal mechanisms. First, high 
between-group inequality limits the material resources available to marginalized groups and, 
thus, their organizational strength. Second, social integration decreases ethnic groups’ distinc-
                                                 
5 Marable 2007, 54. 
6 See, e.g., Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001; Horowitz 1985; Mason 2003. Without using the same term, 
other scholars have also examined ethnic stratification; see e.g. Hechter 1975; Smith 1969. 
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tiveness and internal cohesion, which reduces the strength of collective mobilization. While this 
lack of organizational strength affects collective action in general, it becomes particularly conse-
quential in the case of costly and high-risk forms of it, such as armed rebellion. Third, stable be-
tween-group hierarchies make coercion on the part of the ruling regime more effective. This pre-
vents the emergence of viable military challenges, especially to central state power. Finally, high 
social integration decreases the opportunities for armed rebellion, even in the face of profound 
inequality, by increasing interdependence between groups. This fourth mechanism operates most 
strongly against secessionist attempts. 
Hence, this argument deviates from grievances-based theories of ethnic conflict, which ex-
pect the conflict-fueling effect of ethnic mobilization to be strongest in those countries that ex-
hibit the most profound inter-group inequalities.7 According to these works, the more severe eth-
nic inequality is, the stronger the collective grievances on the part of the marginalized groups, 
and the more likely violent resistance. Some scholars also explicitly or implicitly assume that 
ethnic groups as such generally possess similar mobilization capacities and face similar opportu-
nities to rebel.8 Thus, these approaches usually treat the political opportunity structure and 
groups’ mobilization capacity, on the one hand, and ethnic inequality, on the other hand, as al-
ternative explanations for civil conflict. Moreover, despite their groundbreaking insights, previ-
ous works on ethnic stratification and ranked ethnic systems did not offer any theoretical and 
empirical assessment of the origins of ranked ethnic systems nor of the relationship between dif-
ferent ethnic systems and the likelihood of violent conflict at the global level. In fact, Horowitz 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Stewart 2008; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009. 
8 Denny and Walter 2014, 200, 202; Esteban and Ray 2008; Robinson 2001. The latter two studies con-
trasted ethnicity as a unidimensional concept with class. 
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argued that ranked and unranked ethnic systems are equally prone to conflict, albeit of different 
forms.9 In contrast, this study specifies the historical origins of distinct ethnic cleavage types in 
the majority of today’s states and theorizes their consequences for ethnic groups’ organizational 
strength and their opportunities to rebel. Thus, it embeds the concept of ethnic systems in a 
broader theory of colonial state-building, inequality, and political violence in the contemporary 
world. 
European overseas colonialism has decisively shaped the type of ethnic cleavages that we 
observe today. The colonial settler states that became independent under the continuing rule of 
the European settlers (or their descendants) constitute archetypical cases of stratified ethnic sys-
tems. I distinguish these settler states from what I call the “decolonized states,” where independ-
ence resulted in self-rule by the formerly colonized people. The retreat of the colonizers – and, 
thus, the breakdown of the primary hierarchy – and the legacy of colonial policies of “divide and 
rule” have made the decolonized states paradigmatic examples of segmented multiethnic states. 
Therefore, the colonial settler states and the decolonized states constitute the two sets of cases 
where the empirical implications of my theoretical argument should be most evident. 
Using new data on the linguistic and religious segmentation of ethnic groups, I test my ar-
guments in a global quantitative study of all multiethnic states from 1946 to 2009. The empirical 
results confirm, first, that the extremely unequal colonial settler states experience less violent 
ethnic conflict than the decolonized states and other multiethnic countries. Second, beyond the 
                                                 
9 Horowitz 1985, 22, 30. Similarly, Mason claimed that when inter-group conflict in ranked ethnic sys-
tems occurs it should be particularly violent; see Mason 2003, 91. Guelke also argues that in societies 
composed of dominant and subordinate groups – and, in particular, of settlers and natives – ethnic divi-
sions are especially prone to lead to violent political conflict; see Guelke 2012. 
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comparison of post-colonial states, ethnic conflict is generally more likely the more segmented 
and less hierarchically structured multiethnic states are. Third, in line with the theory, stable be-
tween-group hierarchies reduce the risk of governmental conflict, whereas segmentation only 
affects secessionist conflicts. Additional robustness tests indicate that the theorized equilibrium 
of inequality holds when examining the immediate post-independence period of the settler states 
and when controlling for the identity of colonial powers, democratic freedoms, natural resource 
production, as well as different measures of state strength. I also provide evidence for the exoge-
neity of my main independent variables by accounting for those factors that may have affected 
how colonialism ended. 
Hence, beyond the far-reaching international consequences of ethnic (and, especially, se-
cessionist) conflict, my study also highlights its historical international sources. Previous studies 
have already pointed out how international factors, such as geopolitical competition, colonialism, 
or military mobilization affected state formation,10 the emergence of democratic political institu-
tions,11 and countries’ economic development.12 The results of this study suggest that their pre-
sent-day conflict-proneness, too, greatly depends on the historical structure of ethnic group rela-
tions resulting from specific colonial legacies. 
 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Blaydes and Paik 2016. 
11 See, e.g., Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004. 
12 Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006. 
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European Colonialism, State Formation, and Ethnic Stratification 
European overseas colonialism is the instance of colonial expansion that has most directly 
molded the contemporary international state system, creating almost two thirds of all current 
multiethnic states.13 I distinguish between two specific classes of European ex-colonies: the co-
lonial settler states and the decolonized states, which constitute the two sets of cases where the 
empirical implications of my theoretical argument should be most evident. The colonial settler 
states are those states that became de jure or de facto independent under the continuing rule of 
the European settlers (or their descendants) over the indigenous population. Thus, codified as 
racial distinctions, the colonial hierarchies – composed of the white rulers, the subjugated aborig-
inal populations and (in the case of the Americas) the imported African slaves and their descend-
ants – were directly carried over to the post-independence period. This is true for both Latin 
American and English settler colonies. Although the latter have been characterized by more po-
litical equality among the European settlers14 their institutions are based on the same inequality 
between the settlers and the racially defined others as in Latin America. 
Moreover, the conquered groups in the colonial settler states have become incorporated in-
to the political and economic institutions (legal order, organization of land ownership, political 
party system, etc.) set up by the European settlers. Through linguistic and religious assimilation 
they have also adopted the settlers’ cultural institutions to a certain degree. For instance, African 
                                                 
13 Following Weber 1976[1922], ethnicity can be defined as a subjectively experienced sense of common-
ality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture. This belief is usually nurtured by suppos-
edly innate traits that are shared by members of a group, such as language, religion or certain phenotypi-
cal features; see Horowitz 1985, 51-52. 
14 See Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006. 
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Americans in the USA, Afro-Brazilians in Brazil, or indigenous people in El Salvador and Hon-
duras all speak the language of the dominant group of their states. Likewise, in Guatemala and 
Ecuador, indigenous people have become incorporated into the religious institutions set up by 
their conquerors. As a result, ethnic groups in the colonial settler states are socially highly inte-
grated. These states thus constitute archetypical cases of stratified or “ranked” ethnic systems, 
according to my definition. 
In contrast, the decolonized states are countries that were ruled by a European power dur-
ing the period of overseas colonialism but became independent under the self-rule of the former-
ly colonized people. These were generally resource colonies in Asia, Africa, and a few territories 
in the Caribbean and the Pacific. While their independence in the 20th century was equivalent to 
decolonization, their ethnic cleavages were also profoundly shaped by European colonialism. In 
order to control the subjugated indigenous populations the colonial rulers turned to policies of 
“divide and rule,” consciously fostering linguistic, religious, and tribal distinctions between 
groups. Colonial administrative penetration – especially tax and labor policies, as well as educa-
tional institutions – strengthened these segmented ethnic identities over time.15 As a conse-
quence, independence and decolonization marked the transformation of racially ranked societies 
to congregations of “separate subsocieties,”16 assembled within a common political territory. 
                                                 
15 Posner 2005; Vail 1989. It is true that by introducing their own languages to the colonies’ administra-
tive and educational systems, the colonizers also provided the decolonized states with a lingua franca. 
Yet, rather than providing the basis for group identities, these colonial languages serve as a tool of class 
differentiation within ethnic groups, separating the elites from the masses. 
16 Horowitz 1985, 36. 
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For instance, Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in Iraq; Baluchis, Pashtuns, Punjabis, and Sindhis 
in Pakistan; the Muslim Fulani, Christian Beti, and Christian, but Anglophone Bakweri groups in 
Cameroon; and the Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka are all assembled within a 
common political territory shaped by European colonizers, but they remain divided into distinct, 
relatively independent social systems. Moreover, although colonial favoritism towards specific 
groups was quite common, with the retreat of the colonizers the primary hierarchy disappeared. 
Therefore, ethnic segmentation, rather than stratification, is the most common ethnic cleavage 
type in these states.17 
It is important to note that European colonial rule took very brutal forms in both types of 
European ex-colonies. Yet, while the intense, relatively short-term quest for natural resources 
also resulted in appalling regimes of colonial exploitation in Africa,18 the external and internal 
colonization of the Americas occurred over a longer period of time. The genocidal impact of 
colonial conquest, labor exploitation, and imported diseases significantly decimated the indige-
nous people in the Americas, to the degree that they now constitute (sometimes small) minorities 
in almost all states. Nevertheless, since at least the 1970s, a new wave of ethnic group mobiliza-
                                                 
17 The most prominent potential exceptions are probably Rwanda, Burundi, and India. Yet, although the 
Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi have been considered ranked ethnic groups, whatever hierarchy 
existed between them before and during colonialism was definitely altered by the retreat of the coloniz-
ers. It is indicative that the distribution of political power between Hutu and Tutsi and the victims of eth-
nic persecution were precisely opposite in the two countries after independence. While the Indian caste 
system constitutes a paradigmatic case of a ranked ethnic system, post-colonial India is characterized by a 
multitude of alternative ethnic divisions that mitigate, or even contradict, the caste hierarchies; see 
Chandra 2005. 
18 Young 1994. 
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tion has gained traction even in those colonial settler states with very small minority populations, 
such as Paraguay or El Salvador.19 In many cases, such mobilization occurred under an umbrella 
political identity at the national level, as, for example, in the case of indigenous people in Argen-
tina or African Americans in the USA; in other cases, it was propelled by distinct ethnic groups, 
such as the Garifuna in Honduras or the Miskito in Nicaragua.20 
Finally, both the colonial settler states and the decolonized states can be distinguished from 
those countries in Europe and (less commonly) Asia that were never subject to European over-
seas colonialism. In most of these cases, state formation was promoted by a core ethnic group 
that is now recognized as the titular group of the respective state. Many of them emerged out of 
larger empires, such as the Ottoman Empire or the Soviet Union. Although some of them also 
contain significant numbers of settlers from these former occupying powers (such as the Rus-
sians in Latvia, Belarus, or Turkmenistan), the crucial difference to the colonial settler states is 
that the independence of these states was promoted by, and attained under the rule of, an “indig-
enous” state-building group. As will be shown in Figure 2 below, this type of state building has 
also led to stable ethnic hierarchies in some cases.21 Yet, the core group at the center and the ge-
ographically concentrated linguistic and/or religious minorities often constitute relatively seg-
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Vogt Forthcoming. 
20 The EPR-ETH dataset used in this study combines indigenous groups in the Americas into one single 
politically relevant ethnic group where they underwent a joint process of political mobilization at the na-
tional level. Only groups that experienced historically distinct paths of mobilization are treated as separate 
politically relevant groups. Since the statistical analyses of this study rely on country-level indicators, 
these differences do not affect my empirical results. 
21 See also Hechter 1975; Wimmer 2002. 
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mented subsocieties, quite similar to those in the decolonized states. In those cases where state 
building remained unfinished and the state was never able to firmly penetrate its whole territory, 
as, for example, in Afghanistan, ethnic groups are even more likely to constitute independently 





Ethnic Movements and Inter-group Violence 
Following Tilly, the term “political mobilization” can be broadly defined as “the process 
by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in 
public life.”23 I argue that whether ethno-political mobilization triggers violent inter-group con-
flict greatly depends on the historically determined ethnic cleavage types, which shape both the 
organizational strength of group mobilization and the “structure of political opportunities.”24 In 
                                                 
22 These are all countries in which ethnicity has been politically relevant, according to the EPR-ETH da-
taset (see the explanations in the data section below). Countries that do not meet this definition, such as 
Haiti or Ireland, are thus excluded from the empirical analyses below. To determine the colonial origins 
of states, I largely followed Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; and Hensel 2014, with the excep-
tions of those cases that I define as colonial settler states. 
23 Tilly 1978, 69. 
24 McAdam 1982, 40. The two most prominent studies emphasizing the role of opportunities in the recent 
civil war literature are probably Fearon and Laitin 2003, and Collier and Hoeffler 2004. However, their 
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particular, I focus on two properties of cleavage types: the extent of between-group hierarchiza-
tion and the degree of ethnic groups’ social integration. In the colonial settler states and other 
stratified ethnic systems, stable between-group hierarchies and a high degree of social integration 
produce an “equilibrium of inequality,” in which the marginalized groups lack both the organiza-
tional strength and the opportunities for armed rebellion. As a consequence, while ethnicity is not 
necessarily less politicized in these states than in other countries peaceful ethno-political conten-
tion emerges as the most viable strategy for the subordinated groups. In contrast, ethnic mobili-
zation in the decolonized and other segmented states is more likely to trigger violent conflict. 
 
Resource Mobilization, Group Identities, and Organizational Strength 
Stable between-group hierarchies limit the organizational strength of historically marginal-
ized groups’ mobilization and thus reduce the likelihood of violent insurgencies. Any social 
movement must control and mobilize a certain amount of resources (for example, money, facili-
ties, and labor) in order to carry out collective action.25 While this argument applies to collective 
action in general, it is especially true for violent challenges to the state, which are costlier in ma-
terial terms and entail higher economic opportunity costs than other forms of contentious ac-
                                                                                                                                                             
focus on poverty, natural resources, and state strength is different from the group-centered approach taken 
in this study. 
25 McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978. 
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tions.26 The costlier and riskier collective action is, the more difficult it is to organize and, thus, 
the more resources are needed. 
Elite members of groups play a crucial role in mobilizing these resources.27 Yet, because of 
the entrenched between-group hierarchies (which tend to extend to the economic realm), the elite 
of the historically marginalized groups in stratified ethnic systems is often too small and too 
weak to mobilize the necessary resources. At the same time, the material incentives of these 
leaders to be co-opted and sacrifice collective struggles in favor of (further) individual advance-
ment are also particularly high. As a result, the material co-option of a handful of group leaders 
is often enough to undermine mobilization and, thus, prevent rebellion. If, in addition, average 
group members are poor, they will not be able to financially contribute to, or supply the neces-
sary labor for, organizational processes. 
In contrast, where between-group hierarchies are less stable, intra-ethnic stratification 
should be more pronounced. In other words, each ethnic group in these states usually has its own 
elite and poorer stratum, which facilitates the provision of the necessary resources for ethnic re-
bellion. For example, in decolonized Nigeria, each of the main ethnic groups had their own na-
tional leaders that were able to organize the non-elite group members into powerful political or-
ganizations, which subsequently served to mobilize individuals for violence.28 As Esteban and 
Ray note, “[s]uch inequalities possess their own perverse synergy. Specifically, the rich within a 
                                                 
26 This applies, above all, to the type of violence examined in this article: civil conflict. As I will discuss 
in the concluding section, the causal mechanisms presented here may not apply equally to other forms or 
strategies of inter-group violence. 
27 Esteban and Ray 2008, 2186. 
28 Diamond 1988. 
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group can supply the resources for conflict, while the poor supply conflict labor” [emphasis in 
the original].29 
The organizational strength of group mobilization is also a function of the degree of ethnic 
groups’ social integration. By the social integration or segmentation of ethnic groups, I refer to 
the extent to which groups are embedded within the same socio-economic and cultural institu-
tions. Institutions can be defined as established sets of norms, values, and modes of action and 
interaction that govern particular aspects of social life.30 Specifically, social integration reduces 
the strength of collective mobilization by decreasing ethnic groups’ distinctiveness and internal 
cohesion. Distinct and cohesive collective identities make group boundaries more evident and, 
thus, operate against cross-cutting membership in political organizations. They also make indi-
vidual assimilation more difficult.31 The more integrated groups are, the less distinct and cohe-
sive their group identities and, as a consequence, the easier it is for individuals to cross group 
boundaries and seek political or economic advancement as individuals. This individual “escape 
hatch” hampers the collective political organization of groups as a whole. In contrast, the more 
segmented groups are, the more distinct and cohesive their collective identities and, consequent-
ly, the greater their potential for political organization. 
Again, while this mechanism affects ethnic mobilization in general, it becomes particularly 
consequential in the case of costly and high-risk collective action, such as armed revolt, because 
                                                 
29 Esteban and Ray 2008, 2186. It is important to emphasize again that in contrast to my argument, 
Esteban and Ray make this observation for ethnic groups in general, without distinguishing between dif-
ferent cleavage types. 
30 Radcliffe-Brown 1965. 
31 Gurr et al. 1993, 126-127; Madrid 2012. 
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under such conditions individuals have even greater incentives to cross group boundaries (if pro-
vided with the opportunity).32 In other words, the centrifugal forces that affect collective action 
are greater the riskier and costlier such collective action gets, requiring more organizational 
strength to keep individuals together and prevent them from defecting. 
 
Coercion, Interdependence, and the Opportunities for Armed Rebellion 
Next to the organizational strength of group mobilization, the political opportunity struc-
ture plays a crucial role in explaining ethnic group rebellion. Stable between-group hierarchies 
affect the political opportunity structure by making coercion on the part of the ruling regime 
more effective. Specifically, the unequal distribution of the political and socio-economic instru-
ments of power in the colonial settler states provides the dominant ethno-class with a wide array 
of coercive measures against challenging groups. These range from monitoring the subordinated 
group(s) and economic coercion (for example, the denial of access to resources, boycotting the 
labor of members of these groups for certain periods of time, etc.) to outright violent repression 
by the unilateral use of military force.33 The dominant ethno-class can also dissuade the subordi-
nated groups from challenging the status quo through the clientelistic distribution of resources 
and through policies of divide and rule. 
Between-group hierarchies should be most consequential for armed revolts directed against 
the state center. State power is usually strongest at its center and, thus, coercion works most ef-
fectively against direct challenges to governmental power. In contrast, if marginalized ethnic 
                                                 
32 Laitin 2000. 
33 Mason 2003, 86-91. 
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groups inhabit territorial pockets where the political authority of the dominant group is compara-
tively weak, they might be able to avoid repression and challenge the state in their own territory. 
As a consequence, group hierarchization should have a stronger deterring effect on conflicts over 
government than on territorial (or secessionist) conflicts. 
These arguments obviously apply to any type of multiethnic society. The more profound 
political and economic inequality between ethnic groups is, the more adverse the political oppor-
tunity structure facing the marginalized group(s). Yet, due to their distinct historical legacy, the 
ranked colonial settler states are particularly likely to feature such stable between-group hierar-
chies. Only in the case of an extremely unequal demographic balance, when the subordinated 
groups form an overwhelming majority – as, for instance, in Zimbabwe and South Africa – coer-
cion becomes too costly (or even impossible) to sustain. 
High social integration also narrows the political opportunity structure. The more integrat-
ed ethnic groups are, the higher their interdependence. In the colonial settler states and other 
highly stratified ethnic systems, individual members of the dominant and subordinated groups 
are often embedded in tightly knit, hierarchically structured relationships, taking on a patron-
client, employer-worker, officer-soldier, or similar format. This social and economic interde-
pendence decreases both the opportunities and incentives of the marginalized groups for sus-
tained violence. For instance, the status of the small circle of elites of subordinated groups in the 
colonial settler states usually depends on their adhesion to the dominant culture and their access 
to the resources of the ruling group.34 Hence, while they may try to peacefully mobilize members 
of their ethnic group to enhance their political leverage, these elites will have little interest in a 
                                                 




violent escalation of political conflicts. Conversely, the dominant ethno-class usually depends on 
the labor supply (for example, for food production) by the subordinated groups. Thus, high de-
grees of social integration and the associated interdependence of ethnic groups should generally 
decrease the likelihood of violent inter-group conflict. In contrast, ethnic groups in highly seg-
mented societies are more likely to constitute (and perceive themselves as) self-standing com-
munities able to exist as separate entities. 
Of course, geography is an important aspect of social integration. Because socio-economic 
and cultural institutions are often adopted across groups as a result of spatial proximity, ethnic 
groups in segmented societies are also more likely to be geographically segmented.35 Therefore, 
they usually possess the separate territorial bases that facilitate the coordination of insurgent ac-
tions, especially for secessionist movements.36 As discussed above, this situation is common for 
ethnic groups in the decolonized states, which often inhabit distinct geographic zones, as, for 
instance, the Kurds in Iraq or the Diola in Senegal. It also applies to many titular nation states 
with sizeable ethnic minorities, as the examples of the Basque country and the Russian-speaking 
eastern part of the Ukraine show. In the case of strong collective grievances, ethnic groups in 
these states are more likely to seek secession than the highly integrated ethno-classes in the colo-
nial settler states. 
The comparison of the two classes of post-colonial states leads us to the first hypothesis of 
this study: 
                                                 
35 Note that when empirically examining the causal mechanisms responsible for the different ethnic con-
flict rates, I control for the degree of geographic overlap between ethnic groups in order to disentangle the 
distinct effects of social integration and geography. 




H1: Colonial settler states are less prone to violent ethnic conflict than decolonized states. 
 
Yet, while the colonial settler states and the decolonized states are archetypical cases of 
ranked and segmented ethnic systems, respectively, my theoretical arguments about the effect of 
distinct cleavage types on the likelihood of violent conflict should be applicable to all multieth-
nic countries. Hence, from the foregoing explanations, three additional hypotheses can be de-
duced to test the general validity of my theory: 
 
H2: Stable between-group hierarchies decrease the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict. 
H3: High social segmentation increases the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict. 
H4: High social segmentation increases the risk of territorial conflict, whereas stable group hi-
erarchies decrease the likelihood of governmental conflict. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
Before turning to the empirical analyses, I will address three potential objections to my ar-
guments. First of all, the choice of peaceful, rather than violent, strategies may also depend on 
the degree of democratic freedom. In democratic systems where groups are more likely to trust 
the existing regime to address their grievances, peaceful strategies should be more likely. How-
ever, the examples of South Africa and the USA under Jim Crow show that even formally func-
tioning democratic systems may systematically disregard demands from specific ethnic groups, 
22 
 
whether they are expressed through conventional institutional channels or through peaceful pro-
test activities.37 In fact, as Gamson famously pointed out, while democratic regimes are designed 
to take into account and balance the interests of established polity members, they tend to system-
atically resist (and sometimes actively oppress) the interests of challenging groups.38 It is not 
surprising then that according to previous research, the empirical relationship between democra-
cy and civil conflict is shaky at best.39 Nevertheless, countries’ level of democracy might certain-
ly play a role and, therefore, will be controlled for in the following quantitative analyses. 
Second, as discussed above, the racial minority population in some of the colonial settler 
states is very small. One could thus argue that these minorities are simply too small to rebel, 
and/or that violent rebellions of underprivileged groups occur under a different, non-ethnic ban-
ner. In this case, the colonial settler states would not be very different from any of the nation 
states in the Western hemisphere that became ethnically homogenized centuries ago40 and are 
now characterized by a large demographic majority group that is also politically dominant. Ac-
cording to this argument, the theorized equilibrium of inequality is caused entirely by homogene-
ity, rather than ethnic stratification. 
Third, and relatedly, such ethnic homogenization is likely to be associated with a high de-
gree of state consolidation. Cultural homogenization was most likely to occur in states that were 
able to exert strong administrative power in their territories over a long period of time. Despite 
                                                 
37 Marx 1998. 
38 Gamson 1975. 
39 See, e.g., Vreeland 2008. 
40 Mann 2005. 
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the political marginalization of the “surviving” ethnic minorities,41 such old, consolidated states 
should be less conflict-prone than younger states.42 Thus, from this view, the equilibrium of ine-
quality and the differences between the colonial settler states and the decolonized states would 
simply be a function of state consolidation. Both of these latter two scenarios suggest that the 
colonial settler states are a subset of a more general class of consolidated, homogenous countries, 
implying a causal logic that is distinct from my own theoretical argument. I will address these 
objections empirically by controlling for state consolidation and ethnic homogeneity in the re-
gression models. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The empirical analysis includes all independent multiethnic countries of the world, cover-
ing the time period from 1946 – or the country’s year of independence – to 2009. It examines 
ethnic inequality and civil conflict in three types of multiethnic states: the colonial settler states, 
the decolonized states, and a residual category composed of non-colonized states and those that 
became independent from other types of foreign rule (see Table 1 above). 
 
Dependent Variable: Ethnic Civil Conflict 
This study focuses on ethnic violence in the form of civil conflict. The civil war data stem 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset where a conflict is defined as a contested incom-
patibility over government or territory between two parties of which at least one is the govern-
                                                 
41 Hechter 1975; Mann 2005; Wimmer 2002. 
42 Fearon and Laitin 2003. 
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ment of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year.43 In accordance with the 
ACD2EPR dataset, civil conflicts were classified as ethnic if the corresponding rebel organiza-
tions both recruited fighters from a particular ethnic group and made public claims on behalf of 
the group.44 Overall, the sample contains 262 civil conflict onsets (about 4% of all country 
years), of which 155 were classified as ethnic (2.4% of all country years). 
Yet, in highly stratified societies, class and ethnicity tend to overlap and, thus, inter-group 
violence may often take on the form of a class conflict without explicit ethnic claims being ad-
vanced.45 Because this could distort the comparison between the stratified colonial settler states 
and other multiethnic countries, additional analyses rely on a broader operational definition of 
ethnic conflict, which classifies civil conflicts as ethnic if the corresponding rebel organizations 
either recruited fighters from a particular ethnic group or made public claims on behalf of the 
group. This includes all instances of civil violence where rebel organizations relied heavily on 
specific ethnic groups without making explicit ethnic demands. Overall, there are 192 civil con-
flicts (2.9% of all country years) that conform to this broader definition of ethnic civil conflict. 
Finally, hypothesis H4 distinguishes between governmental and territorial conflicts. The 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset defines governmental conflicts as conflicts over regime 
type, replacement of the central government, or a change of its composition, whereas territorial 
conflicts are defined as conflicts over the status of a territory within a given state (i.e. secession 
                                                 
43 Gleditsch et al. 2002. 
44 Wucherpfennig et al. 2012. 
45 Horowitz 1985, 30. 
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or autonomy).46 Of the 155 ethnic civil conflicts in the dataset, following the strict definition, 50 
qualify as governmental (0.8% of all country years), and 105 as territorial (1.6%). 
 
Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Inequality 
To measure the degree of ethno-political inequality, I rely on the Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR-ETH) dataset, version 2.0.47 Constructed on the basis of an expert survey, EPR-ETH pro-
vides information about politically relevant ethnic groups, and their access to executive state 
power, in all countries of the world with a population, in 1990, of at least 500,000.48 Ethnic 
groups are considered “politically relevant” if at least one political organization has claimed to 
represent their interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political 
discrimination.49 Because of its focus on groups that exhibit a minimal level of political mobili-
zation, the EPR data are very well-suited to test my theoretical argument about the distinct con-
sequences of ethnic movements as a function of different ethnic cleavage types. Appendix 1 pro-
vides a list of all ethnic groups included in the EPR-ETH dataset by country. 
Ethnic groups’ access to state power is assessed based on the positions of the political 
leaders representing these groups, focusing explicitly on executive power and using a roughly 
ordinal scale composed of three main categories: i) a group controls power alone (group status of 
monopoly or dominant); ii) shares power with other ethnic groups (either as senior or junior 
                                                 
46 Gleditsch et al. 2002, 619. 
47 Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009. 
48 Version 2.0 of the EPR data covers the time period from 1946 to 2009 and can be accessed at 
http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/other/epr-2.0. 
49 Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 99. 
26 
 
partner); or iii) is excluded from executive state power (group status of regional autonomy, pow-
erless, or discriminated).50 
Previous studies using this dataset have mostly focused on the last category, finding that 
excluded groups are more likely to rebel than included groups and countries with large excluded 
ethnic segments of the population are likely to experience civil conflict.51 However, there are two 
crucial distinguishing features among regimes of ethnic exclusion. First, exclusion may be the 
consequence of one-group ethnic dominance – where all but one ethnic group are excluded from 
access to national-level executive power – or it may stem from an incomplete power-sharing 
regime, in which two or more groups share power but exclude some other groups. Second, ethnic 
exclusion may be more or less persistent over time. 
Both of these characteristics are highly relevant for the concept of hierarchization that con-
stitutes a central element of my theoretical argument. Hence, to gauge the degree of group hier-
archization, the bivariate analyses use two complementary indicators. The first one is a domi-
nance dummy variable that is based on the category of one-group rule. It takes the value of 1 
when an ethnic group controlled power alone in a given country year, being coded as either 
“dominant” or “monopoly” in EPR-ETH, and 0 otherwise.52 Yet, by itself this indicator is not 
enough to assess the stability of group hierarchies because different ethnic groups may be politi-
cally dominant at different points of time. Thus, a second dummy variable records the ethnic 
                                                 
50 See Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 100-101, for precise definitions of the different power status 
categories. 
51 See especially Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009. 
52 In contrast to monopoly power, the EPR status of dominant denotes “token” representation of other 
ethnic groups in the executive, as, for example, an indigenous minister of culture in Guatemala. 
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power shifts in a country. It is coded as 1 in country years, in which EPR-ETH codes a change in 
the coalition of the politically included ethnic groups (for example, when a new group became 
included or when there was a change of senior and junior partners), and as 0 otherwise. 
Moreover, the regression analyses rely on a count variable of the consecutive years of one-
group dominance as a continuous measure of group hierarchization. Finally, when examining the 
casual mechanisms responsible for the different ethnic conflict rates, I also test the impact of 
ethnic exclusion per se, as analyzed in the aforementioned studies (i.e. independent of ethnic 
dominance). To this end, I include a continuous indicator of the relative size of all excluded 
groups as a fraction of the size of all politically relevant ethnic groups in the corresponding re-
gression models. 
 
Social Integration vs. Segmentation of Ethnic Groups 
To empirically capture the idea of socio-economic and cultural “embeddedness” of ethnic 
groups, implied by my definition of integration and segmentation, I rely on group-based indica-
tors of ethnic groups’ linguistic and religious overlap. These indicators stem from the new EPR-
ED dataset,53 which identifies the precise “cultural content” of all ethnic groups included in the 
EPR-ETH dataset by indicating the languages group members speak and the religions they prac-
tice. For each group, the three largest linguistic and religious fragments (in terms of their share of 
the total group population) are reported. 
Both indicators of linguistic and religious segmentation were computed in the same way, 
by calculating group-level differences, which were subsequently aggregated to the country level. 
                                                 
53 Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt Forthcoming. 
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Appendix 2 describes the procedure in more detail and provides a real-world example. Put simp-
ly, the measures indicate from how many other groups in the country, on average, any ethnic 
group is linguistically (or religiously) distinct. Both indicators range from 0 (complete integra-
tion) to 1 (complete segmentation). For example, Uruguay and Rwanda are linguistically highly 
integrated states, in which all groups share one common language (Spanish and Kinyarwanda, 
respectively), whereas Belgium is an example of high linguistic segmentation. Importantly, the 
two indicators do not correlate with each other (r=0.00; p=0.84), justifying their treatment as two 
distinct expressions of ethnic groups’ social integration. 
Note that I refrain from drawing on the commonly used fractionalization indices because 
they refer to the likelihood of individuals to be from different ethnic groups. Moreover, although 
there are important divisions within ethnic groups, existing fractionalization data treat them as 
homogenous, mutually exclusive entities. As a result, these datasets are unable to measure the 
degree of cultural (for example, linguistic or religious) overlap between groups, which is indica-
tive of their social integration or segmentation. 
 
Control Variables 
The control variables attempt to capture those factors that could potentially have an impact 
on both ethnic inequality and ethnic civil violence, such as the level of democracy, economic 
development, state age, country-level ethnic homogeneity, and the prior occurrence of ethnic 
violence. The latter is captured by the number of previous ethnic conflicts in a given country. I 
use the Polity index54 and a GDP per capita variable from the Penn World Table, version 7.0,55 to 
                                                 
54 Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989. 
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assess the level of democracy and economic development. Moreover, an additional robustness 
test employs a democracy indicator from the new V-Dem dataset, version 6.1,56 instead of the 
Polity index. State age is measured with a count variable of the number of years since independ-
ence, based on the independent-states dataset by Gleditsch and Ward.57 Country-level ethnic ho-
mogeneity is proxied by the size of the single largest ethnic group in a country as a fraction of 
the country’s total population, according to the EPR-ETH dataset. I also include a total country 
population variable, drawn from the Penn World Table, in all models. 
In additional robustness tests, I examine the plausibility of a number of other potential al-
ternative explanations. First, previous studies of the long-term effects of colonial legacies fo-
cused on the identity of the colonizers58 whereas my own argument is centered on the (ethno-
racial) identity of the promoters and beneficiaries of independence. To compare the explanatory 
weight of the two alternative approaches with respect to violent ethnic conflict, I include colonial 
power dummies, taken from Hensel.59 Second, post-colonial violence may be more likely if in-
dependence was achieved through violent struggle. Therefore, an additional robustness model 
includes a violent-independence dummy variable based on the same data source. Third, as an 
alternative to my measure of state consolidation introduced above, I test the effect of a state’s 
extractive capacity, measured by the tax ratio (i.e., a state’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP). 
                                                                                                                                                             
55 Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011. 
56 Coppedge et al. 2015. 
57 Gleditsch and Ward 1999. 
58 E.g., Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006. 
59 Hensel 2014. 
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These data are taken from Thies.60 Fourth, particular colonial legacies may be related to distinct 
economic profiles in terms of natural resource production – which, in turn, may have an effect on 
conflict likelihood. Hence, another robustness model controls for countries’ per capita oil and 
diamond production quantities (the two resource types that figure most prominently in conflict 
studies), based on data from Humphreys.61 
Furthermore, when testing the postulated causal factors responsible for the equilibrium of 
inequality (between-group hierarchy and social integration), I take into account the impact of 
ethnic groups’ settlement patterns, i.e. the degree of their geographic overlap. For this purpose, I 
employ a count variable of the number of ethnic groups that live dispersed throughout the coun-
try’s territory, taken from the GeoEPR-ETH dataset.62 The more groups that live dispersed 
throughout the country, the more geographic overlap should exist. 
Finally, since my analysis examines the effect of distinct colonial legacies by comparing 
the colonial settler states with the decolonized states and other multiethnic countries, I assess 
potential concerns of endogeneity with regard to these state type indicators. This exogeneity test 
accounts for those factors that may have affected how colonialism ended: physical accessibility, 
historical disease environment, and historical resource attractiveness of countries, drawing on 
                                                 
60 Thies 2010. 
61 Humphreys 2005. 
62 Wucherpfennig et al. 2011. The GeoEPR-ETH dataset defines dispersed groups as groups whose mem-
bers do not inhabit any particular region or that are migrant (e.g., nomadic groups). 
31 
 
data on countries’ proximity to a coast,63 logged settler mortality rates,64 and soil fertility,65 re-
spectively. Appendix 3 provides summary statistics of the main independent variables. 
 
Statistical Estimation 
The study draws on bivariate analyses and logistic regression models of ethnic conflict on-
set to test the theoretical argument. In the logit models, the unit of analysis is the country year, 
and the data are formatted as a pooled panel with yearly time intervals. Because civil conflict 
onsets are very infrequent, I rely on logistic regressions for rare events data, as proposed by King 
and Zeng.66 To account for temporal dependence within countries, the models contain a cubic 
polynomial of ethnic-peace years.67 Moreover, because the different observations within a coun-
try are likely to be correlated, the result tables below report country-clustered Huber-White 
standard errors.68 
 
                                                 
63 Nunn and Puga 2012. This is the average distance, in thousands of kilometers, to the closest coast in 
each country. 
64 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001. The indicator is constructed as the annualized deaths per 
thousand mean strength among soldiers, bishops, and sailors in the colonies between the 17th and 19th 
centuries, based on the earliest available number for each country. 
65 Nunn and Puga 2012. This is the percentage of the land surface area of each country that has fertile soil 
(defined as soil that is not subject to severe constraints for growing rainfed crops). 
66 King and Zeng 2001. 
67 Carter and Signorino 2010. 
68 Rogers 1993. 
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Ethnic Conflict in Post-colonial States 
Ethnic Stratification and the Equilibrium of Inequality 
Figure 1 compares the colonial settler states, decolonized states, and other multiethnic 
countries in terms of both dimensions of ethnic stratification: the stability of group hierarchy and 
ethnic groups’ social segmentation. The former is measured by the average frequencies of one-
group dominance and ethnic power shifts observed in the data between 1946 and 2009;69 the 
latter by the observed mean levels of linguistic and religious segmentation. The results show 
sharp differences between the three state types. Ethnic group relations are clearly most hierar-
chical in the colonial settler states. One-group dominance is the common situation in these states, 
while ethnic power shifts are very rare. In contrast, although they are not spared from the risk of 
ethnic dominance, the decolonized states feature much more fluid ethnic power structures, as 
different ethnic groups become politically included and excluded over time. Specifically, the 
frequency of ethnic power shifts is much higher than in both the colonial settler states and other 
multiethnic countries. 
Interestingly, the values of the countries that remained unaffected by European overseas 
colonialism lie exactly in between those of the European ex-colonies. While nation-state building 
has also resulted in ethnic inequalities in these states,70 their group hierarchies are, on average, 
clearly less pronounced than in the colonial settler states. Overall, the two types of European ex-
colonies constitute actual poles in terms of group hierarchization, testifying to the distinct long-
term consequences of this particular instance of colonialism. 
                                                 
69 Note that I multiplied the ethnic power shifts values by 10 to make them compatible with the scale of 
the other three variables displayed in Figure 1. 






As previously argued, the decolonized states and the countries that remained unaffected by 
European overseas colonialism are much more similar in terms of ethnic groups’ segmentation. 
In fact, the latter category even displays somewhat higher average values of linguistic and reli-
gious segmentation. Both of these state types differ hugely from the colonial settler states which 
exhibit by far the lowest segmentation values. In other words, ethnic groups in these states are 
not only very hierarchically organized, but also highly integrated in social terms. This provides 
strong evidence for the stratified nature of the colonial settler states. 
Figure 2 illustrates how these distinct cleavage types affect the likelihood of ethnic civil 
conflict. It shows the observed rates of ethnic conflict onset in the colonial settler states, the de-
colonized states, and other multiethnic countries between 1946 and 2009, according to the two 
different operational definitions described above (ethnic claim and recruitment vs. either claim 
or recruitment). Ethnic stratification in the settler states goes hand in hand with a significantly 
lower risk of violent ethnic conflict. The average frequency of ethnic conflict onset was about 
eight times lower in the colonial settler states than in the decolonized states, and over four times 
lower than in other multiethnic countries. The results do not change very much when employing 
the broader operational definition of ethnic conflict. In fact, the difference between the two clas-






Modeling the risk of ethnic conflict onset in all multiethnic states between 1946 and 2009, 
the logit regression analyses in Table 2 provide further evidence for the theoretical argument, by 
controlling for the influence of other relevant factors. I first show a reference model composed of 
the most commonly used explanatory variables in quantitative civil war research. I then intro-
duce two dummy variables for the decolonized states and other multiethnic countries, with the 
colonial settler states as the baseline category. The results of Model 1 mirror the findings in the 
existing literature.71 Low economic development, large populations, and the prior occurrence of 
ethnic violence all increase the risk of ethnic conflict. The results also confirm that a democratic 
state system by itself does not necessarily prevent the outbreak of inter-group violence. Introduc-
ing the two dummy variables, Model 2 reveals that the decolonized states and other multiethnic 
countries indeed have a significantly higher ethnic conflict risk, as expected, even when control-
ling for other factors, such as economic development and the level of democracy. The GDP per 
capita variable actually loses a considerable part of its effect once we introduce the state type 




Model 3 again takes into account those instances of civil violence where rebel organiza-
tions relied heavily on specific ethnic groups without making explicit ethnic demands. Thus, the 
model replicates Model 2, using the alternative ethnic conflict onset variable, based on the 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006. 
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broader operational definition of ethnic conflict, as dependent variable.72 This leaves the results 
virtually unaffected. Even the residual category of other multiethnic countries still exhibits a 
clearly higher ethnic conflict risk than the settler states. Model 4 adds the controls for state age 
and ethnic homogeneity. The empirical results do not support the alternative explanations dis-
cussed above. Neither of these control variables exerts a statistically significant effect on the 
dependent variable. In contrast, the state type dummy variables remain robustly related to a high-
er probability of ethnic conflict onset. 
Thus, the consolidation of state and nation by itself cannot account for the enormous dif-
ference in ethnic conflict risk between the colonial settler states and the decolonized states (and 
other multiethnic countries). Indeed, many highly homogenous countries among decolonized and 
titular nation states – for example, the Philippines, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – have experienced 
protracted ethnic conflicts between the state and small minorities. Extremely small ethnic groups 
(sometimes constituting less than one percent of their country’s population) have also been able 
to mount serious military challenges to such countries as Russia, India, Myanmar, or Bangla-
desh. Thus, group size by itself can certainly not account for the lack of armed mobilization by 
small minorities in the colonial settler states. 
Appendix 4 presents seven additional robustness models.73 Models A1 and A2 control for 
the identity of the colonizers by including dummy variables for the six most important colonial 
powers (measured by the number of observations in the dataset of this study). Model A1 only 
                                                 
72 Note that the model also uses adjusted ethnic conflict history and peace years variables that are in line 
with the different version of the outcome variable. 
73 Note that due to missing observations in the additional control variables, the number of observations 
decreases in some of these robustness models. 
36 
 
includes the alternative colonial classifiers, whereas Model A2 tests them against my own state 
type dummy variables. Model A3 includes the violent independence dummy variable, and Model 
A4 uses the indicator of states’ taxing capacity as an alternative measure of state strength. Model 
A5 replaces the Polity index with the V-Dem indicator of participatory democracy to test wheth-
er the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of democracy. This index measures the 
degree of active participation by citizens in all political processes, both electoral and non-
electoral, and is therefore well-suited to gauge the relationship between democratic freedom and 
the choice of violent or non-violent contention.74 Furthermore, Model A6 controls for countries’ 
natural resource profile proxied by their per capita oil and diamond production quantities. The 
two state type dummies remain completely robust in all models. In Model A1, the effect of the 
Spanish colony dummy is statistically significant. Yet, it is clearly weaker than the effects of the 
state type dummies and turns insignificant once the latter are included in Model A2. The other 
additional controls do not exert a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. All 
remaining variables behave more or less the same as in Table 2. 
Finally, Model A7 tackles potential concerns of endogeneity in my main independent vari-
ables. The above analysis considered the colonial settler states and decolonized states (and other 
multiethnic countries) as state types that received a distinct treatment in terms of colonial herit-
age, entailing distinct ethnic cleavage types. However, these colonial legacies could themselves 
be the results of causally prior factors that were not only responsible for how colonialism ended 
but subsequently also influenced the likelihood of post-independence ethnic conflict. My empiri-
                                                 
74 I also ran Model A5 using the V-Dem indicators of electoral and liberal democracy. The results are 
virtually the same. I refrain from including these three indicators together in the same model because they 
are extremely highly correlated (pairwise correlations above r=0.97). 
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cal approach in Model A7 is based on the idea that how colonialism ended depended on the tim-
ing and intensity of European settlement.75 Territories with earlier and higher influx of European 
settlers were more likely to become independent under European rule, i.e. as colonial settler 
states. In turn, this influx of settlers was likely to be influenced by the accessibility and attrac-
tiveness of the territories. Easily accessible territories that offered living conditions conducive to 
European settlers, as well as those that promised exploitable resources were more likely to expe-
rience early and extensive European settlement. Hence, Model A7 tests whether the considera-
tion of the physical accessibility (distance to coast), historical disease environment (logged set-
tler mortality rates), and historical resource richness (soil fertility) of countries undermines the 
explanatory weight of my main treatment.76 
The results speak against the notion of endogeneity. While none of these additional control 
variables exerts a significant effect on ethnic conflict risk, the two state type dummy variables 
remain robustly related to the outcome variable. In summary, these results provide strong support 
for hypothesis H1 and highlight the long-term consequences of the ethnic cleavage types pro-
duced by distinct outcomes of European overseas colonial rule. 
                                                 
75 See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001. 
76 Alternatively, I also ran Model A7 using a measure of the fraction of the population with European 
descent in 1900, also taken from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, instead of these three varia-
bles. The main difference in the results is that the effect of the dummy variable for other multiethnic 
countries also becomes highly significant again. Note that the number of observations in this model de-
creases considerably because the data on settler mortality focus on ex-colonies broadly defined, see 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 1370, 1377. Yet, they also include many countries that are con-
sidered non-colonized states in my classification, such as China, Thailand, and Ethiopia. Therefore, I keep 




Testing the Mechanisms: The Origins of the Equilibrium of Inequality 
In order to get closer to the causal mechanisms driving these findings, the present section 
focuses on the two properties of ethnic cleavage types highlighted in the theoretical argument: 
between-group hierarchies and social integration. This also serves to test the main tenets of my 
theory for all multiethnic countries in general. Models 5 through 7 in Table 3 examine the ex-
planatory power of these cleavage properties, by including three additional variables: the count 
variable of the consecutive years of one-group dominance as a measure of group hierarchization, 
as well as the linguistic and religious segmentation indicators. Model 5 tests their effects on eth-
nic conflict onset in general, whereas Models 6 and 7, respectively, focus on governmental and 
territorial conflicts only. All models control for the degree of ethnic groups’ geographic overlap. 
They also include the continuous indicator of the relative size of all excluded groups to control 





In Model 5, the coefficients of all three cleavage variables point in the expected directions 
and are statistically significant. First, the results give strong support to the effect of social seg-
mentation, referred to in hypothesis H3, although in the case of religious segmentation the coef-
ficient falls short of the standard 95% confidence level (p=0.07). Generally, the more segmented 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009. 
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ethnic groups are in either linguistic or religious terms, the more likely is ethnic conflict. Second, 
the results also highlight the importance of stable between-group hierarchies, as expressed in 
hypothesis H2. The longer political dominance lasts – i.e. the more stable group hierarchies are – 
the lower the risk of ethnic conflict. At the same time, the ethnic exclusion indicator has a signif-
icant positive effect on ethnic conflict risk. Hence, while ethno-political inequality generally in-
creases the risk of ethnic conflict onset, stable group hierarchies – in the form of long-term eth-
nic dominance – make ethnic conflict less likely. This attests to the relevance of the distinction 
between different regimes of ethnic exclusion. 
Figure 3 shows a contour plot of the risk of ethnic civil conflict as a function of both lin-
guistic segmentation and the number of consecutive years of one-group dominance, based on 
Model 5. It confirms that conflict risk is greatest where group hierarchies are least stable and 
ethnic groups are most segmented. This is the area in the bottom right corner. The figure also 
suggests that between the two variables, linguistic segmentation has a stronger effect on ethnic 
conflict risk. At high levels of segmentation, the risk of civil conflict is still higher even if the 
group hierarchy is very pronounced (area in the upper right corner) than at low hierarchization 
values combined with low linguistic segmentation (bottom left corner). This is precisely why the 
few highly hierarchical decolonized states (such as Sudan) are still more likely to experience 
violent ethnic conflict than the equally hierarchical, but much more integrated colonial settler 
states. It also explains the higher conflict rates of non-colonized but segmented nation states, 






Models A8 and A9 in Appendix 5 show that these results are robust to alternative measures 
of ethnic heterogeneity. Model A8 controls for the number of relevant ethnic groups in a country 
(according to EPR-ETH), while Model A9 includes the ethnic fractionalization and polarization 
indices from Alesina et al.78 None of these control variables alters the results in any significant 
way. Finally, Model A10 tests for a potential non-linear effect of the years of one-group domi-
nance by including a quadratic version of the variable. To interpret the coefficients and visualize 
the precise form of the effect of between-group hierarchies, Appendix 6 plots the predicted prob-
abilities of ethnic conflict onset as a function of the number of dominance years, based on Model 
A10. It shows that there is only a relatively soft curve in the predicted probabilities. While the 
conflict risk slightly augments in the first years of ethnic dominance, it decreases steadily after 
about twenty years. This is very much in line with the theoretical argument of this study. The 
notion of stratification advanced therein implies very stable group hierarchies (besides high so-
cial integration) that go beyond the more temporary ebbs and flows of ethnic inclusion and ex-
clusion. Hence, the negative effect of ethnic dominance persistence only becomes really pro-
nounced after a large number of years, i.e. when between-group hierarchies are indeed highly 
entrenched. 
Furthermore, Models 6 and 7 in Table 3 lend support to hypothesis H4, confirming the dis-
tinct effects of hierarchization and segmentation on governmental and territorial conflicts, re-
spectively.79 The size of the coefficient of the hierarchization variable almost doubles in the gov-
ernmental-conflict Model 6 compared to Model 5, but becomes considerably weaker and statisti-
                                                 
78 Alesina et al. 2003. 
79 Again, these two models use adjusted peace years variables that refer to the distinct outcome variables 
(i.e. to governmental and territorial conflicts, in particular). 
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cally insignificant when it comes to territorial conflicts. In contrast, the effect of linguistic seg-
mentation becomes much stronger and more significant in the territorial-conflict Model 7 com-
pared to Model 5, whereas it is almost indistinguishable from 0 in Model 6. The effect of reli-
gious segmentation is consistently positive and somewhat more important for territorial than 
governmental conflicts, but remains statistically insignificant in these models. Overall, these 
findings lend strong credibility to my theory by showing that its main tenets are valid for multi-
ethnic states in general. 
 
A Look Back in History 
The comparison between colonial settler states and decolonized states could be flawed if 
most ethnic rebellions in the former occurred soon after independence. In this case, the above 
analysis – setting in in 1946 – would simply miss the relevant time period in the colonial settler 
states. To examine this possibility, I draw on the COW intrastate war dataset,80 the only conflict 
dataset that reaches back into the 19th century, to compare the frequency of ethnic civil conflict 
in the first 70 years after independence of all European ex-colonies. Since the COW data do not 
distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, I manually classified all included conflict 
instances in this time period according to the same criteria of claim and recruitment applied in 
the post-World War II period.81 
                                                 
80 Sarkees and Wayman 2010. 
81 Note that the COW dataset employs a much higher threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths per year than 
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset. The COW data also code civil war onsets for countries when 
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Figure 4 shows the ethnic conflict rate (defined as the number of onsets divided by the 
number of country observations) in each of these first 70 years after independence in both cate-
gories of post-colonial states. The results clearly reveal that even immediately after independ-
ence, the colonial settler states experienced very few ethnic civil conflicts and much fewer than 
the decolonized states would experience after their independence a century later. There are only 
eight conflicts recorded in the COW data that can be coded as ethnically based (0.4% of all coun-
try years), compared to 51 in the decolonized states (1.4%; two-tailed t-test: p=0.000).82 Thus, 
the theorized equilibrium of inequality resulting from profound ethnic stratification has been a 





The findings of this article suggest that the present-day dynamics of ethnic politics contin-
ue to be profoundly shaped by the legacies of distinct colonial experiences. Indeed, one could 
argue that colonialism has never really ended in the settler states where the conquered groups 
continue to form the lower stratum of relatively integrated systems of ethno-classes. This internal 
                                                                                                                                                             
they are involved in civil wars of other countries (e.g., the US interventions in Somalia or Laos). I exclud-
ed these cases from my analysis. 
82 The ethnic civil conflicts that occurred in the colonial settler states during their first 70 years of inde-
pendence include, for example, the black uprising in Cuba in 1912, the Caste War of Yucatán in Mexico, 
the conquest of Patagonia in Argentina, and the violent conflicts in Zimbabwe. 
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colonialism is not only associated with high stratification but also with significantly lower levels 
of inter-group violence than in other multiethnic countries. In contrast, the later resource colonies 
that were liberated from colonial rule now grapple with societies divided into distinct ethnic 
segments whose boundaries and identities were very much institutionalized by European colo-
nizers imbued with ethno-nationalist ideas and eager to divide the subjugated population. Alt-
hough – or precisely because – ethnic hierarchies tend to be less pervasive in these states, ethnic 
group mobilization is more likely to turn violent than in the colonial settler states. 
These findings deviate from the expectations inherent in many existing theories of ethnic 
conflict that civil violence should be most likely where inter-group inequalities are most pro-
found.83 Instead, they show that historically determined ethnic stratification may result in an 
equilibrium of inequality, in which marginalized groups lack both the organizational strength and 
the opportunities for armed rebellion. Beyond the comparison of post-colonial states, the empiri-
cal results of this study suggest that ethnic conflict is most likely where the ethnic cleavages cre-
ated by the historical processes of state building run vertically between socially segmented 
groups. Hence, while the colonial settler states are certainly not the only countries with durable 
regimes of ethnic dominance, the theorized equilibrium of inequality seems to be contingent on 
the degree to which oppressors and oppressed form “ascriptively defined components of a single 
society.”84 It is most powerful in the colonial settler states because they constitute archetypical 
cases of such ranked ethnic systems. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that this article has focused on a particular type of 
inter-group violence, namely civil war. Its findings do not necessarily apply equally to the rela-
                                                 
83 Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Stewart 2008; Wimmer 2002. 
84 Horowitz 1985, 23. 
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tionship between ethnic mobilization and other forms of inter-group violence, such as communal 
violence. Also, particular strategies of violence, as, for example, terrorism, may exhibit distinct 
dynamics that escape the underlying premises of my theoretical argument. For instance, the or-
ganizational strength of group mobilization necessary to carry out terrorist attacks is likely to be 
lower than what is required for the formation of an armed group capable of fighting in a civil 
conflict (even a low-level conflict). Nevertheless, by using an operational definition of ethnic 
civil war with a relatively low threshold of battle deaths, the above analysis also captured many 
of these low-scale instances of inter-group violence. 
What are the broader implications of these results for the academic research on ethnic poli-
tics? First of all, whereas conflict researchers often follow Barth’s encompassing approach to 
ethnicity, which draws no distinction between different ethnic markers,85 this article emphasizes 
the lasting political impact of distinct ethnic cleavage types related to specific markers, such as 
race, language, and religion. Specifically, in contrast to the stratifying force of race, linguistic 
and religious segmentation of ethnic groups increases the risk of violent ethnic conflict. Moreo-
ver, previous studies that focused on specific ethnic markers tended to regard religious divisions 
as particularly violence-prone.86 In contrast, the results of this study suggest that linguistic seg-
mentation might actually be more critical than religious segmentation, especially for separatist 
violence. This structural approach to explaining ethnic groups’ opportunities for secession also 
contributes to the literature on secessionist conflicts, which so far has mostly focused on groups’ 
                                                 
85 Barth 1969. 
86 E.g., Juergensmeyer 1993; Hassner 2009. An exception is Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt Forthcoming. 
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grievances,87 trans-border ethnic kin relations,88 institutional opportunities for mobilization,89 
and the strategic interaction between state governments and ethnic challengers.90 
Second, the results of this study also suggest that rather than treating ethnic inequality and 
the political opportunity structure as two alternative explanations for civil war, we should regard 
both of these factors (as well as groups’ mobilization capacity) as at least partly a function of 
distinct structures of ethnic group relations. By emphasizing the historical roots of these struc-
tures, the study joins a recent literature that has analyzed the lasting effects of specific colonial 
legacies.91 Yet, in contrast to these studies, which have usually examined the legacies of different 
colonial powers in terms of democratic political institutions and economic development, I argue 
that when it comes to ethno-political institutions and conflict, the crucial distinction lies in the 
ethno-racial identity of the promoters and beneficiaries of independence. 
Finally, if we envision ethnic politics as playing out in a dyadic relationship between the 
government and its challengers,92 my findings have implications for the understanding of either 
side. On the one hand, certain types of ethnic cleavages are more likely to feature what Tilly 
called “durable inequality”93 than other cleavage types, which are associated with less pervasive 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., Gurr et al. 1993. 
88 Cederman et al. 2013; Saideman 1997. 
89 See, e.g., Brancati 2006. 
90 Walter 2006. 
91 Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; Lange, Mahoney, and vom 
Hau 2006; Mahoney 2010. 
92 Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Tilly 1978. 
93 Tilly 1998. 
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inter-group inequality. At the same time, higher equality often carries with it an element of com-
petition. In such a situation, ethnic movements may play a highly dangerous role by fueling eth-
nic violence. In contrast, the historical oppression built into stratified ethnic systems is usually 
challenged by more peaceful attempts of political emancipation. Hence, by highlighting the con-
trasting effects of ethnic movements as a consequence of distinct historical legacies, this study 
helps to systematize the wealth of empirical research on ethnic politics, and as such to move to-
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Appendix 1. Politically relevant ethnic groups by country (EPR-ETH, version 2.0) 
Country Ethnic groups 
Afghanistan Aimaq, Turkmen, Tajiks, Pamir Tajiks, Qizalbash, Pashtuns, Nuristanis, Uzbeks, Baloch, Pashai, Brahui, 
Hazaras 
Albania Greeks, Albanians, Macedonians 
Algeria Berbers, Arabs 
Angola Ovimbundu-Ovambo, Bakongo, Lunda-Chokwe, Mbundu-Mestico, Cabindan Mayombe 
Argentina Argentinians, Indigenous peoples 
Armenia Armenians, Russians, Kurds 
Australia Whites, Aborigines, Asians 
Austria Slovenes, Austrians 
Azerbaijan Lezgins, Armenians, Azeri 
Bahrain Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs 
Bangladesh Bengali Muslims, Tribal-Buddhists, Biharis (Urdu-Speaker), Bengali Hindus 
Belarus Russians, Byelorussians, Poles 
Belgium Walloon, Germans, Flemings 
Benin Southwestern (Adja), Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun), South/Central (Fon), Northern (Bariba, 
Gurmanché/Betamaribe etc.) 
Bhutan Sharchops, Lhotsampa (Hindu Nepalese), Ngalops (Drupka), Bhutanese 
Bolivia Aymara, Bolivians, Quechua, Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups 
Bosnia and Herze-
govina 
Roma, Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks/Muslims 
Botswana Tswana, Tswapong, Mbukushu, Yeyi, White, Birwa, Kalanga, Kgalagadi, Herero/Mbanderu, San 
Brazil Whites, Afro-Brazilians, Indigenous peoples 
Bulgaria Macedonians, Bulgarians, Turkish, Pomaks, Roma 
Burundi Tutsi, Hutu 
Cambodia Khmer, Cham and Malays, Khmer Loeu (incl. Kui), Thai-Lao, Vietnamese, Chinese 
Cameroon Beti (and related peoples), Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples), Bassa/Duala, Bamileke, South-
western Anglophones (Bakweri etc.), Northwestern Anglophones (Grassfielders) 
Canada English speakers, Aboriginal peoples, French speakers 
Central African 
Republic 
Sara, Goula, Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.), Baya, Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Man-
djia, Sara, Goula), Mbaka, Yakoma 
Chad Hadjeraï, Sara, Muslim Sahel groups, Toubou, Arabs, Zaghawa, Bideyat 
Chile Chileans, Other indigenous peoples, Mapuche 
China Mulao, Hui, Oroqen, Evenk, Taiwanese, Dong, Gelo, Nu, Bonan, Xibe, Jingpo, Yi, Bouyei, Qiang, She, 
Zhuang, Chinese (Han), Salar, Yugur, Daur, Blang, Koreans, Tujia, Manchu, Bai, Wa, Yao, Lisu, Uy-
ghur, Dai, Russians, Naxi, Maonan, Tajiks, Tu, Uzbeks, Tibetans, Pumi, Jinuo, Dongxiang, Jing, Achang, 
Kirgiz, Lahu, Kazakhs, Mongolians, Shui, Miao, Hani, Li 
Colombia Afrocolumbians, Columbians, Indigenous peoples 




Country Ethnic groups 
Costa Rica Indigenous peoples, Afro-Costa Ricans, Costa Ricans 
Croatia Roma, Italians, Croats, Bosniaks, Hungarians, Serbs 
Cuba Whites, Blacks 
Cyprus Turks, Greeks 
Czechoslovakia Hungarians, Roma, Slovaks, Czechs 
Democratic Re-
public of the 
Congo 
Ngbandi, Bakongo, Luba Kasai, Tetela-Kusu, Luba Shaba, Mongo, Mbandja, Azande-Mangbetu cluster, 
Tutsi-Banyamulenge, Lulua, Other Kivu groups, Lunda-Yeke, Ngbaka 
Djibouti Isaas (Somali), Afar 
Ecuador Afroecuadorians, Ecuadorians, Indigenous peoples 
Egypt Arab Muslims, Coptic Christians 
El Salvador Salvadorans, Indigenous peoples 
Eritrea Other Muslims, Other Muslims, Kunama, Christians, Afar 
Estonia Ukrainians, Russians, Byelorussians, Estonians 
Ethiopia Somali (Ogaden), Muslim Eritreans, Amhara, Christian Eritreans, Oroma, Other Southern Nations, Hara-
ri, Afar, Beni-Shugal-Gumez, Tigry 
Fiji Indians, Fijians 
Finland Finns, Swedes 
France French, Roma, Basques, Corsicans 
Gabon Orungu, Fang, Nkomi, Myéné, Eshira/Bapounou, Mbédé (Batéké, Obamba) 
Gambia Wolof, Fula, Diola, Aku (Creoles), Mandinka 
Georgia Ossetians (South), Azeri, Russians, Armenians, Abkhazians, Georgians 
Ghana Other Akans, Asante (Akan), Ga-Adangbe, Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi), Ewe 
Greece Muslims, Greeks, Macedonians, Roma 
Guatemala Mayas, Guatemalans 
Guinea Peul, Malinke, Susu 
Guinea-Bissau Papel, Balanta, Manjaco, Cape Verdean 
Guyana Indigenous peoples, Afro-Guyanese, Indo-Guyanese 
Honduras Hondurans, Indigenous peoples (Lenca, Maya-Chorti, Miskito, Tawahka/Sumu, Xicaque, Pech, Nahua), 
Garifuna 
Hungary Roma, Hungarians 
India Other Backward Classes (Castes), Indigenous Tripuri, Telugu (non-SC/ST), Bodo, Marathi (non-SC/ST), 
Bengali (non-SC/ST), Tamil (non-SC/ST), Malyalam (non-SC/ST), Kannada (non-SC/ST/OBCs), Guja-
rati (non-SC/ST/OBCs), Scheduled Castes & Tribes, Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs), Assamese (non-SC/ST), 
Kashmiri Muslims, Other Muslims, Naga, Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST), Manipuri, Mizo, Oriya (non-
SC/ST/OBCs) 
Indonesia Ternate, Papua, Makassarese and Bugis, Malay, Achinese, Sundanese, Javanese, Madura, Amboinese, 
Gorontalos, Minahasa, Minangkabaus, Chinese (Han), Balinese, Bataks, Dayak, East Timorese 
Iran Zoroastrians, Bahais, Arabs, Kurds, Jews, Baloch, Persians, Azeri, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmen 
Iraq Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs 
Israel Mizrahim (Jewish), Palestinian Arabs, Israeli Arabs, Ashkenazim (Jewish), Russians (Jewish) 
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Country Ethnic groups 
Italy German speakers (Austrians), Friulians, Italians, Aostans (French speakers), Roma, Sardinians 
Ivory Coast Southern Mande, Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur), Baule, Other Akans, Kru 
Japan Okinawans, Okinawans, Ainu, Koreans, Japanese 
Jordan Palestinian Arabs, Jordanian Arabs 
Kazakhstan Tatars, Kazakhs, Uighur, Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Germans 
Kenya Kikuyu-Meru-Emb, Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu, Mijikenda, Luo, Kisii, Luhya, Kamba, Somali 
Kosovo Turks, Roma, Albanians, Serbs, Gorani 
Kuwait Kuwaiti Shi'a (Arab), Bedoon, Kuwaiti Sunni (Arab) 
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Russians, Uyghur 
Laos Lao Tai, Lao Thoeng (excl. Khmou), Lao Sung (excl. Hmong), Lao (incl. Phuan), Hmong, Khmou 
Latvia Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Byelorussians 
Lebanon Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Protestants, Sunnis (Arab), Palestinians (Arab), Druze, Armenian 
Catholics, Shi'a Muslims (Arab), Alawites, Maronite Christians, Greek Orthodox 
Liberia Gio, Indigenous Peoples, Krahn (Guere), Americo-Liberians, Mano, Mandingo 
Libya Arabs, Toubou 
Lithuania Lithuanians, Russians, Poles 
Macedonia Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Macedonians, Roma 
Madagascar Highlanders, Côtiers 
Malawi Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde), Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao), Chewa (Cen-
tral) 
Malaysia East Indians, Dayaks, Chinese, Kadazans, Malays 
Mali Arabs/Moors, Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.), Tuareg 
Mauritania Sahrawis, Black Africans, Haratins (Black Moors), White Moors (Beydan) 
Mexico Afromexicans, Mestizo, Indigenous peoples 
Moldova Bulgarians, Gagauz, Russian speakers, Moldovans 
Mongolia Kazakh, Mongols 
Montenegro Croats, Serbs, Roma, Montenegrins, Bosniak/Muslims, Albanians 
Morocco Sahrawis, Arabs, Berbers 
Mozambique Makonde-Yao, Shona-Ndau, Tsonga-Chopi 
Myanmar Shan, Buddhist Arakanese, Kachins, Indians, Kayin (Karens), Indians, Bamar (Barman), Karenni (Red 
Karens), Mons, Wa, Zomis (Chins), Chinese 
Namibia San, Nama, Basubia, Baster, Damara, Mafwe, Himba, Whites, Coloreds, Kavango, Herero, Mbanderu, 
Ovambo 
Nepal Madhesi, Dalits both Hill & Tarai, Muslims in the Terai, Rana/Thakuri, Tharus in the Terai, Hill Brah-
mins/Chetri, Adivasi/Janajati, Hill Brahmins/Chetri excl. Thakuri 
New Zealand New Zealanders, Asians, Pacific Islanders, Maori 
Nicaragua Afronicaraguans, Nicaraguans, Miskitos, Sumus 
Niger Toubou, Kanouri, Djerma-Songhai, Hausa, Tuareg 
Nigeria Tiv, Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt, Ogoni, Yoruba, Ijaw, Igbo 
Pakistan Bengali, Baluchis, Pashtuns, Mohajirs, Punjabi, Hindus, Sindhi, Ahmadis, Christians 
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Country Ethnic groups 
Panama Ngobe-Bugle, Panamanians, Afropanamanians, Choco (Embera-Wounan), Kuna 
Paraguay Paraguayans, Tupi-Guarani and other indigenous groups 
Peru Aymara, Indigenous peoples of the Amazon, Peruvians, Quechua, Afroperuvians 
Philippines Moro, Christian lowlanders, Fil-Chinese, Indigenous 
Poland Roma, European and American Jews, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles, Germans  
Republic of Vi-
etnam 
Kinh (Vietnamese), Hoa (Chinese) 
Romania Germans, Hungarians, Roma, Romanians 
Russia Koreans, Georgians, Byelorussians, Tatars, Ukrainians, Buryats, Karelians, Abkhaz, Kalmyks, Turkmens, 
Komi, Gagauz, Altai, Balkars, Khakass, Komi-Permyaks, Dargins, Jews, Tabasarans, Armenians, Ui-
ghurs, Bashkirs, Laks, Germans, Ingush, Tajiks, Poles, Chechens, Kazakhs, Moldovans, Karachai, Os-
setes, Armenians, Avars, Uzbeks, Latvians, Pamir Tajiks, Russians, Lezgins, Mordva, Finns, Udmurt, 
Adyghe, Yakuts, Kabardins, Kirghis, Tuvinians, Lithuanians, Karakalpaks, Chukchi, Kumyks, Roma, 
Crimean Tatars, Estonians, Nogai, Circassians, Mari, Azerbaijanis, Chuvashes 
Rwanda Hutu, Tutsi 
Saudi Arabia Sunni Wahhabi (Najdi) (Arab), Ja'afari Shia (Eastern Province) (Arab), Sunni Shafii/Sofi (Hijazi) (Arab), 
Ismaili Shia (South)  (Arab) 
Senegal Wolof, Mandingue (and other eastern groups), Serer, Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur), Diola 
Sierra Leone Limba, Kono, Temne, Mende, Creole, Northern Groups (Temne, Limba) 
Slovakia Hungarians, Slovaks 
Slovenia Italians, Serbs, Bosniaks, Hungarians, Albanians, Slovenes, Croats 
South Africa English Speakers, Pedi (North Sotho), Swazi, Tswana, Blacks, Zulu, Asians, Afrikaners, Coloreds, South 
Sotho, Tsonga, Xhosa, San, Venda, Ndebele 
Spain Catalans, Roma, Spanish, Basques, Galicians 
Sri Lanka Moors (Muslims), Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils 
Sudan Rashaida, Azande, Latoka, Dinka, Shilluk, Other Northern groups, Nuba, Beja, Bari, Nuer, Fur, Shaygiy-
ya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla (Arab), Zaghawa, Other Southern groups, Masalit, Other Arab groups 
Switzerland Swiss Italians, Swiss French, Swiss Germans 
Syria Christians, Kurds, Alawi, Druze, Sunni Arabs 
Taiwan Mainland Chinese, Taiwanese, Indigenous/Aboriginal Taiwanese 
Tajikistan Russians, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Tatars 
Tanzania Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans), Zanzibar Arabs, Mainland Africans, Maasai 
Thailand Thai, Hill Tribes, Malay Muslims, Chinese, Shan 
Togo Kabré (and related groups), Ewe (and related groups) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Blacks, East Indians 
Turkey Roma, Turkish, Kurds 
Turkmenistan Russians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmen 
Uganda Langi/Acholi, South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda), Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-
Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur), Teso, Kakwa-Nubian, Banyarwanda, Baganda, Karamojong, Far North-
West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur), Basoga, Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso), Asians, Northerners 
(Langi, Acholi, Teso, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur), South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro), 
Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur) 
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Country Ethnic groups 
Ukraine Russians, Crimean Tatars, Romanians/Moldovans, Ukrainians, Hungarians 
United Kingdom Protestants In N. Ireland, Asians, Scots, English, Afro-Caribbeans, Catholics In N. Ireland, Welsh 
United States of 
America 
American Indians, Asian Americans, Arab Americans, Latinos, Whites, African Americans 
Uruguay Uruguayans, Afro-Uruguayans 
Uzbekistan Uzbeks, Russians, Tajiks, Karakalpak 
Venezuela Indigenous peoples, Venezuelans, Afrovenezuelans 
Vietnam Hoa (Chinese), Khmer, Thai, Tay, Kinh (Vietnamese), Nung, Muong, Hmong, Dao, Gia Rai 
Yemen Northerners, Southern Shafi'i, Northern Zaydis, Northern Shafi'i 
Yemen Arab 
Republic 
Sunni Shafi'I (Arab), Zaydis 
Yugoslavia Bosniaks/Muslims, Roma, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians, Croats, Macedonians 
Zambia Nyanja speakers (Easterners), Lozi (Barotse), Kaonde, Tonga-Ila-Lenje, Lunda (NW Province), Bemba 
speakers, Luvale (NW Province) 
Zimbabwe Ndau (Shona sub-group), Africans, Manyika (Shona sub-group), Shona (minus Ndau), Ndebele-Kalanga-
(Tonga), Shona (minus Manyika & Ndau), Europeans, Shona 
Notes: The table lists all ethnic groups included in the EPR-ETH dataset, version 2.0, for each country. This list is time-variant. 
For example, ethnic groups may split into different, politically relevant sub-groups or, reversely, lower-level ethnic categories 
may become politically relevant as parts of an overarching umbrella category. Therefore, the groups listed in the table for each 





Appendix 2. Calculating linguistic and religious segmentation 
Linguistic and religious segmentation is calculated based on the EPR-ED dataset,94 which identi-
fies the linguistic and religious identities of all ethnic groups included in the EPR-ETH dataset. 
Drawing on the Ethnologue95 and the Joshua Project,96 respectively, the EPR-ED dataset reports 
the three largest linguistic and religious identity fragments of each ethnic group in terms of their 
share of the total group population. Using the case of Romania as an example, Table A1 shows 
how the data are structured. 
 
Table A1: The structure of the EPR-ED dataset 
Country Group Religion 1 Religion 2 Religion 3 Language 1 Language 2 Language 3 
Romania Romanians Romanian 
Orthodox 
  Romanian   
Romania Hungarians Protestantism Roman 
Catholicism 
 Hungarian   





Romania Germans Roman Ca-
tholicism 
Lutheranism  German   
 
The calculation was carried out as described below. Note that while the explanation here focuses 
on linguistic segmentation, the religious segmentation indicator was calculated in the exact same 
way. 
                                                 
94 Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt Forthcoming. 
95 Lewis 2009. 
96 Joshua Project 2011. 
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Step 1: The estimation process starts at the group level by comparing each ethnic group to all 
other groups in the same country in terms of the languages group members speak. Since each 
group can be composed of a maximum of three linguistic fragments, all fragments of each group 
are compared to all fragments of all other groups. If members of group A share at least one 
common language with members of group B, they receive a difference value of 0. In contrast, if 
members of group A do not speak any of the up to three languages reported for group B in the 
dataset, the two groups are defined to be linguistically different, resulting in a difference value of 
1. 
Step 2: For each group, I sum up the linguistic difference values and divide this sum by the num-
ber of other ethnic groups in the country. This gives me a standardized average value of linguis-
tic difference that indicates how much a given ethnic group differs from all other groups in the 
same country in terms of language. If the value is 1, the group in question is linguistically differ-
ent from all other groups. A value of 0 implies that the ethnic group shares a language with each 
other group in the country. If the average linguistic difference value equals 0.5, this means that 
one of two other groups (or two of four other groups, etc.) in the country speaks the same lan-
guage. 
Step 3: The aggregated linguistic segmentation at the country level is simply defined as the mean 
value of all group values. Thus, the measure indicates from how many other groups in the coun-
try, on average, any ethnic group is linguistically distinct. For instance, a country-level value of 1 
means that all groups in the country are linguistically distinct from all other groups. If a country 
has a between-group diversity value of 0.5, this means that, on average, ethnic groups in that 
country are linguistically distinct from half of all other groups. 
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Table A2 illustrates the construction of the linguistic and religious segmentation indicators, using 
the example of Romania from Table A1. The sum of linguistic differences is 3 for all four groups 
because each group differs from all three other groups in the country in terms of language. Di-
viding these sums by 3 (the number of other ethnic groups in the country) results in an average 
value of linguistic difference of 1 for all four groups. Hence, the country-level mean value of 
linguistic segmentation is also 1. In terms of religion, both the Hungarians and the Germans con-
tain one group fragment that practices Roman Catholicism, while the Romanians and the Roma 
are both overwhelmingly Romanian Orthodox. This means that each group shares one religious 
creed with one other group in the country, resulting in a sum of religious differences of 2 for all 
four groups. Dividing these sums by the number of other ethnic groups in the country leads to an 
average value of religious difference of 0.67 for all groups. Thus, the country-level mean value 
of religious segmentation also equals 0.67. 
 
Table A2: Estimation of the linguistic and religious segmentation indicators 
Group Language Sum of Δ Avg. Δ Religion 1 Religion 2 Sum of Δ Avg. Δ 
Romanians Romanian 3 1 Romanian 
Orthodox 
 2 0.67 
Hungarians Hungarian 3 1 Protestantism Roman Ca-
tholicism 
2 0.67 
Roma Romani-Vlax 3 1 Romanian 
Orthodox 
 2 0.67 
Germans German 3 1 Roman Catholi-
cism 
Lutheranism 2 0.67 





Appendix 3. Summary statistics of the independent variables 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ethnic dominance 
dummy 6,552 .60 1 .49 0 1 
Ethnic power shift 
dummy 6,419 .05 0 .23 0 1 
N of consecutive 
dominance years 6,552 14.73 6 18.18 0 64 
Linguistic segmenta-
tion 6,552 .76 .92 .34 0 1 
Religious segmenta-
tion 6,552 .30 .17 .35 0 1 
Relative size of ex-
cluded groups 6,552 .23 .12 .26 0 1 
Polity index 
6,458 .04 -1 7.32 -10 10 
Population size (in 
thousands) 6,236 40,721.03 9,936.63 125,561.60 163.79 1,323,59.00 
GDP per capita 
6,202 6,166.10 3,011.85 7,669.62 49.97 43,69.90 
State age 
6,552 71.08 46 59.85 0 193.00 
Largest group size 
6,552 .63 .63 .23 .16 .98 
Ethnic conflict histo-
ry (strict definition) 6,419 .53 0 1.45 0 16 
Violent independence 
dummy 6552 .51 1 .50 0 1 
Tax ratio 
3,683 .15 .13 .09 .002 1.19 
V-Dem participatory 
democracy 6451 .25 .16 .21 .00 .83 
Per capita oil produc-
tion 4,199 .03 .00 .24 0 4.92 
Per capita diamond 
production 4,199 .09 0 .80 0 13.31 
Distance from coast 
6480 .39 .28 .40 .00 2.21 
Soil fertility 
6433 36.71 35.68 22.08 0 98.29 
Settler mortality 
(logged) 3856 4.57 4.36 1.35 .94 7.99 
N of dispersed ethnic 
groups 6,552 .78 0 1.18 0 9 
64 
 
N of relevant ethnic 
groups 6552 5.14 4 6.75 1 57 
Ethnic fractionaliza-
tion 6413 .49 .51 .25 .01 .93 
Ethnic polarization 
6413 .59 .64 .21 .02 .97 
Peace years 




Appendix 4. Robustness models: cleavage type and ethnic conflict onset 
 Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 Model A5 Model A6 Model A7 
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N 5,998 5,998 5,998 3,440 6,074 3,959 3,619 
Log likelihood -575.267*** -571.752*** -573.001*** -374.738*** -578.240*** -404.109*** -370.280*** 
Note: Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses. Log-likelihood figures obtained from standard lo-





Appendix 5. Robustness models: between-group hierarchies, segmentation, and ethnic con-
flict onset 
 Model A8 Model A9 Model A10 






    








    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    
Constant -6.400*** -7.913*** -6.502*** 
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(1.472) (1.468) (1.190) 
    
N 5,998 5,875 5,998 
Log likelihood -565.897*** -553.254*** -563.563*** 
Note: Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses. Log-likelihood figures obtained from standard lo-





Appendix 6. Effect of number of dominance years on ethnic conflict risk 
 
Notes: Based on Model A10 in Appendix 5 and calculated with simulation methods using Clarify; see King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg 2000. Predicted probabilities of ethnic conflict onset as a function of the number of dominance years. All other varia-







Table 1: Classification of multiethnic states 
European overseas colonialism   Other states 
Colonial settler states Decolonized states  Independent from 
other foreign rule 
Non-colonized 
states 
Argentina  Algeria  Kenya   Afghanistan  China  
Australia  Angola  Kuwait   Albania  Ethiopia  
Bolivia  Bahrain  Laos  Armenia  France  
Brazil  Bangladesh  Lebanon   Austria** Iran  
Canada  Benin  Libya  Azerbaijan Italy  
Chile  Botswana  Madagascar   Belarus Japan  
Colombia  Burundi  Malawi   Belgium Liberia  
Costa Rica  Cambodia  Malaysia  Bhutan Nepal  
Cuba  Cameroon  Mali   Bosnia and Her-
zegovina 
Russia  
Ecuador  Central Afri-
can Republic  
Mauritania  Bulgaria Saudi Arabia  
El Salvador  Chad  Morocco   Croatia Spain  
Guatemala  Congo  Mozambique   Czechoslovakia  Switzerland  
Honduras  Cyprus  Myanmar  Estonia Thailand  
Mexico  Dem. Rep. of 
the Congo  
Namibia   Finland Turkey  
New Zealand  Djibouti  Niger   Georgia United Kingdom  
Nicaragua  Egypt  Nigeria  Greece  
Panama  Eritrea  Pakistan   Hungary  
Paraguay  Fiji  Philippines   Kazakhstan   
Peru  Gabon  Rwanda   Kosovo   
South Africa  Gambia  Senegal   Kyrgyzstan   
United States of America  Ghana  Sierra Leone   Latvia  
Uruguay  Guinea  Sri Lanka  Lithuania  
Venezuela  Guinea-
Bissau  
Sudan   Macedonia   
Zimbabwe  Guyana  Syria   Moldova  
 India Tanzania   Mongolia   
 Indonesia  Togo   Montenegro  
 Iraq  Trinidad and 
Tobago  
 Poland  
 Israel* Uganda   Romania   
 Ivory Coast  Vietnam   Slovakia  
 Jordan Zambia  Slovenia  
    Taiwan   
    Tajikistan  
    Turkmenistan   
    Ukraine   
    Uzbekistan   
    Yemen / Yemen 
Arab Republic 
 
    Yugoslavia/Serbia  
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Notes: The table includes all countries, in which ethnicity has been politically relevant, according to the EPR-ETH dataset used 
in this study. Countries excluded due to this criterion are Burkina Faso, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, 
East Timor, Germany, Haiti, Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, the Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, 
Portugal, Somalia, South Korea, Swaziland, Sweden, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
* Israel is also often treated as a settler state in the pertinent literature see, e.g., Elkins and Pedersen 2005. Yet, the Jewish set-
tlement in Palestine was not connected to the colonial expansion of a European state. In contrast, the Jewish and Arab groups 
living in the territory of the present Israeli state became independent of Great Britain. Hence, I follow Hensel 2014 in consider-
ing Israel a former British colony (and therefore a decolonized state). Note, however, that the empirical results are very similar if 
Israel is included in the settler states category. 






Table 2: Cleavage type and ethnic conflict onset. Rare-events logistic regression results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 



















     








     








     










     








     








     








     








     








     

















     
N 5,998 5,998 5,998 5,998 
Log likelihood -579.913*** -573.152*** -668.165*** -572.031*** 
Note: Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses. Log-likelihood figures obtained from standard lo-
gistic regressions. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. + p ≤ 0.1  
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Table 3: Between-group hierarchies, segmentation, and ethnic conflict onset. Rare-events logistic regression results 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 All ethnic conflicts Governmental Territorial 






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    













    
N 5,998 5,998 5,998 
    
Log likelihood -565.897*** -226.070*** -389.481*** 
Note: Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses. Log-likelihood figures obtained from standard lo-




Figure 1: The stability of group hierarchies and ethnic groups’ segmentation 
 
Notes: The figure shows observed frequencies of one-group dominance and ethnic power shifts in the period from 1946 to 2009, 
as well as observed linguistic and religious segmentation levels, by state type. Ethnic power shifts values multiplied by 10 to 
make them compatible with the scale of the other three variables. 95% confidence intervals derived from two-tailed mean-





Figure 2: Rates of ethnic conflict onset by state type, 1946-2009 
 
Notes: The figure shows the observed frequencies of ethnic conflict onset, according to the two different definitions, by state type 





Figure 3: Ethnic conflict risk as a function of hierarchization and segmentation 
 
Notes: Based on Model 5 in Table 3, using the “margins” command in Stata 14. Graph shows the predicted ethnic conflict risk 
as a function of linguistic segmentation and the number of consecutive years of one-group dominance. All other variables held 





Figure 4: Rates of ethnic conflict onset in colonial settler states and decolonized states. Historical comparison 
 
Notes: Calculated based on the COW intrastate dataset and a manual classification of conflicts as ethnic or non-ethnic, accord-
ing to criteria applied in ACD2EPR dataset. The x-axis represents a count variable of years after independence, rather than the 
actual calendar year. 
 
